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IN TIlESovietUnion, a conference on the "measurement and behavior
of unemployment" could be concerned only with other countries,
because in the official view unemployment at home simply does not
exist. "In 1953, as in preceding years, there has been no unemploy-
ment,"typical of pronouncements which have appeared repeatedly
in Soviet publications since the abolition of unemployment insurance
on October 9, 1930.
Unemployment in capitalist countries, on the other hand, is found
to be on a large scale. For example, a Soviet source reports the number
of "fully and partially unemployed" in the United States in 1952 as
13 million, which is calculated by adding to the number of fully un-
employed (about 2 million) the number of persons working less than
thirty-five hours per week. The latter are called "unemployed," in the
Soviet view, because "the overwhelming majority work less than half
a week, and their meager salary places them in a situation which can
be distinguished only in small degree from that of the unemployed."2
The alleged high degree of unemployment in capitalist countries and
the absence of unemployment at home are frequently contrasted in
the Soviet press.
It is quite conceivable on the face of it that a planned society such
as the Soviet Union, undergoing rapid economic expansion, would
1Pravda,January 31, 1954.
2Akademiianauk SSSR, Ekonomika kapitalisticheskikh stran posle vtoroi mirovol
voin!,: statisticheskil sbornik, Moscow, 1953, pp. 238-239, 251-252 and 262-263.
The Monthly Labor Review, No. 3, 1950, 1951 and 1952, is given as the source
for data on the fully unemployed and the number working less than thirty-five
hours.
The following comments on official U.S. unemployment data are also offered:
statisticians employ other diverse contrivances in order to understate
the number of unemployed. As a rule, only the number of insured unemployed are
included, while persons seeking work for the first time are not—this concerns a
great mass of youth and women. Also not included are beggars, hobos, etc., a
significant stratum of declassed, degraded people, spawned continuously by capital-
ism....inaddition, American bourgeois statisticians resort even to such tricks
as excluding the number with a job but not working; and of these there is a large
number." (p. 239.)
[389]SOVIET UNION LABOR FORCE MATERIALS
eliminate unemployment, at least of the type associated with the busi-
ness cycle and with the failure of the economy to grow (and the
demand for labor to increase) rapidly enough to absorb the services
of an expanding labor force. In addition, if planning itself were a suc-
cess, other types of unemployment, stemming from frictions, seasonality,
labor immobility, etc., would tend toward an irreducible minimum.
This general view would seem to be the basis for the "right to work"
enjoyed by every Soviet citizen according to Article 118 of the Soviet
Constitution:
"Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work, that is, are
guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in
accordance with its quantity and quality.
"The right to work is insured by the socialist organization of the
national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of
Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises,
and the abolition of unemployment."
In the sense that a citizen has the opportunity to work at going wage
rates and under existing working conditions, there is little evidence that
this guarantee is not carried out in practice, although it should be noted
that existing working conditions may include the particularly severe
conditions prevailing in the remote areas of the U.S.S.R. Furthermore,
persons may be restricted from certain types of work for political
reasons, work for which they are otherwise qualified. However, beyond
a certain point political considerations can subject the individual to
forced labor.
Prior to the abolition of unemployment insurance at the end of 1930,
unemployment varied from a iow of 0.2 million in 1922 to a high of
1.7 million in 1929. At the peak, the unemployed were about 2 per cent
of the civilian labor force, but 18 per cent of the labor force of wage
and salary (The overwhelming majority of the civilian labor
force was "self-employed" on family farms.)
The first question is whether the rate of economic growth under the
Five-Year Plans could have led to a sufficient increase in the demand
for labor to have eliminated this unemployment and to have kept
abreast or ahead of the increases in the labor force. In general, this
seems to have been the case: National income has been growing since
1928 at an average rate of from 5 to 10 per cent per year,4 while the
8Dataon unemployment are from Soviet sources in S. M. Schwarz, Labor in
the Soviet Union, Praeger, 1952, p. 38. Data on the labor force are adapted
from Table 1 (1926), below.
4Cregory Grossman, "National Income," in Soviet Economic Growth: Conditions
and Perspectives, Abram Bergson, editor, Row, Peterson, pp. 5-11.
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growth of the labor force has averaged less than 2 per cent per year.5
The expansion of output, together with the relatively high rate of
investment, would seem to have been adequate for the full employment
of the labor force.
The prospect for unemployment under the Five-Year Plans therefore
arises in connection not with the fundamental growth characteristics
of the economy, but with the problems of resources allocation within
the broad outlines of the Plans, and in connection with the planning
technique itself.
Soviet attempts to solve this problem include the method of balanced
estimates, incorporated into the Plans.° Among others, there is a man-
power balance (balans rabochei sily) in which the supply of labor by
geographical areas and the labor requirements of respective industries
are brought into line with each Assuming that the balanced
estimates are accurately drawn, in both real and money terms, and that
prices and wages reflect the supply and demand conditions of the Plan,
fulfillment requires that managers of enterprises not only meet the
planned output but conduct their operations, including the hiring (and
firing) of labor, on the basis of strict financial accountability. Fulfill-
ment also requires that labor's services be provided according to the
projected manpower balance. Failure of any or all conditions to be
satisfied could lead to imbalance in the operation and fulfillment of
the Plan, i.e. to a less than optimum allocation of resources from the
standpoint of the Plan, including the theoretical possibility of unem-
ployment at some points while the demand for labor was unsatisfied
at others.
A particularly significant departure from optimum conditions appears
where the manager of an industrial enterprise or collective farm ac-
quires or retains labor in excess of that warranted by strict financial
or economic considerations, motivated perhaps by greater concern for
the fulfillment of output goals than for real or money costs or, in the
case of the collective farm, by the difficulty of getting collective farm
members to work an adequate number of days. Labor hired beyond the
point dictated by economic rationality has been said to represent "hid-
den unemployment."8
Warren W. Eason, "Population and Labor Force," in ibid., p. 121.
6 For a discussion of the method of balanced estimates, see Alexander Baykov,
The Development of the Soviet Economic System: An Essay on the Experience of
Planning in the U.S.S.R., Macmillan, 1946, pp. 444ff.
For example, B. Babynin, "Voprosy balansa rabochei sily," Planovoe khoziai,stvo,
No. 9, 1939, pp. 56-70.
8 Alfred R. Oxenfeldt and Ernest van den Haag, "Unemployment in Planned
and Capitalist Economies," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1954,pp.
43-60.
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The expression "hidden unemployment" is suggested because the
general economic effect of the excess hired labor is the same as with
unemployment proper, namely, a less-than-optimum utilization of labor
resources from the standpoint, of productivity in the economy as a
whole. It is considered "hidden" because the distinguishing feature of
urtemployment, an excess of labor supplied over labor demanded at
going wage rates, has been eliminated.
To conceive in this way of one manifestation of the less-than-optimum
utilization of labor in terms of an explicit characteristic (unemploy-
ment) of another manifestation is a useful descriptive device, but it
does not move us very far toward a real understanding of a very com-
plex construct of interrelationships. Furthermore, the problem of ex-
pressing the less-than-optimum utilization of labor quantitatively in
unemployment equivalents is a formidable if not impossible task.°
In any event, the aimofthis paper falls short of such an ambitious
undertaking. As far as unemployment is concerned, attention will be
given to several instances in which explicit unemployment might be
expected to exist, as suggested by available data on employment and
on the population; and some further remarks will be made on the sub-
ject of "hidden unemployment" in connection with specific examples.
The principal purpose of the paper is to discuss the impact of Soviet
planning and economic expansion on the supply of labor, with particu-
lar attention to the proportion of the population in the labor force and
the distribution by economic sectors, and to examine trends in the
percentage of full-time participation of the labor force.
The introduction of economic planning after 1928 modified the
operation of the Soviet labor market, and together with the program of
rapid industrialization and economic expansion, brought about marked
changes in the composition of the labor force. On the eve of the Five-
Year Plans, at the time of the 1926. census, more than 85 per cent of
0Oxenfeldtand van den Haag express it (ibid., pp. 58-59) "... wemust
therefore measure ... hiddenunemployment through ... productivity.... Since
it is impossible to isolate hidden unemployment from other factors affecting pro-
ductivity, we cannot hope to measure it accurately."
Incidentally, the Soviet source cited in note 2, above, has the following to say
about "hidden unemployment" in the United States, in a discussion of the implica-
tions of "partial unemployment," by which is meant persons working less than
thirty-five hours per week:
"Partial unemployment is a characteristic of the general crisis of capitalism; it
is one of the signs of the rotting of the capitalist economy, the growth of un-
utilized productive capacity, and the increasing impoverishment of the proletariat.
Enterprises working with a large amount of unutilized capacity frequently prefer
not to discharge workers, but to shorten the workweek. By this means, capitalists
endeavor to shift the burden of unemployment to as large a number of wage and
salary workers as possible, and at the same time to conceal the true amount of
unemployment" (p. 239).
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the civilian labor force were self-employed or unpaid family workers,
and of these, the overwhelming majority were occupied in agriculture.
Wage and salary workers comprised only 11.5 per cent of the civilian
labor force, the unemployed 1.2 per cent, and the number working as
members of producer cooperatives and collective farms, between 1 and
2 per cent.
The consequences of the introduction of the Five-Year Plans were a
large increase in the number of wage and salary workers, the transfer
of most of the agricultural labor force from the status of self-employed
and unpaid family workers to membership in collective farms while
permitting the retention of small homestead garden plots, the widening
of the producer cooperative network within the handicrafts sector, and
the increased use of forced labor. The most important development
was the increase in the number of wage and salary workers, linked with
the expansion of industry, which will be discussed in this paper by way
of comparison with changes in the other economic sectors.
Of special interest is the fact that in spite of the increase in the
socialized sectors of the labor force (wage and salary workers, col-
lective farmers, cooperative handicraftsmen, and the military), to in-
clude by the late 1930's between 75 and 80 per cent of the total labor
force estimated from reported data, the majority of the labor force still
retains at least a part-time link with what is strictly a "self-employed
and unpaid family worker" status. This link is through the homestead
farm operated by all collective farmers and by a certain number of
wage and salary workers, espeáially in rural areas, and through the
continued existence of a small number of private farmers and artisans.
Finally, the yearly average number of persons "working" or "em-
ployed" in all sectors as a percentage of the total reported labor force
is seen to display a substantial increase by the late 1930's, the result
of the increase in the number of wage and salary workers, the relative
decline of the agricultural labor force, and widened demands on the
available labor time of the collective farmer and his family. This
development forms the basis for a general discussion of trends in labor
utilization."
The paper is divided into three parts. The first deals with the overall
relationship of the labor force to the population and the second, with
the distribution of the labor force by economic sectors. The third part
discusses labor utilization and includes summary remarks on unem-
ployment.
2. Relationship of Labor Force to Population
At the time of the 1926 census, two years before the start of the Five-
Year Plans, 86.2 million persons, or 58.7 per cent of the total population,
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were "economically active"bo (see Table 1). Of these, 84.4 million were
gainfully occupied, unemployed, or in the military and the remainder (1.9
million) were dependents of institutions and persons receiving "unearned
income." Borrowing terminology now current in the United States,
the sum of the gainfully occupied and the unemployed will be called
the "civilian labor force," and including the military, the "total labor
force."12
The overwhelming majority of the civilian labor force in 1926 con-
sisted of self-employed or unpaid family workers—78.1 million, or 87.8
per cent; and of these, 70.5 million were in agriculture. In other words,
the dominant economic unit in the Soviet economy before the Five-
Year Plans, at least in terms of the labor force, was the family farm.
The remainder of the civilian labor force was made up of wage and
salary workers, mostly nonagricultural, and the unemployed (see
Table 1).
Unpaid family workers comprised 48.5 million or 57.4 per cent of the
civilian labor force, with all but a negligible number (349,000) in agri-
culture; and among unpaid family workers, 32.2 million or 66.4 per cent
were females. The percentage of females in other groups was lower
10 "Economically active" (samodeiatel'nye) under the census is defined to in-
clude all persons receiving wages or other income, as well as unpaid family work-
ers, plus dependents of State and other institutions and persons receiving so-called
"unearned income." In other words, "noneconomically active" are persons de-
pendent on other individuals for their source of livelihood.
11 Under the census, persons "having an occupation" included wage earners
(rabochie), salaried employees (sluzhashchie), professionals(litsa svobodnykh
pro fessii), proprietors with hired labor (khoziaeva s naeinnymi rabochimi), pro-
prietors working only with members of their families, and members of artels
(khoziaeva, rabotaiushchiesia tol'ko s chienarni sem'i I chieny arteli), persons
working alone (odinochki), and family members helping in the occupation (chieny
sern'i, porno gaiushchie v zaniatii). Listed separately are the unemployed (bezrabot-
nye), the military (voennosluzha.thchie), and economically active persons not hav-
ing or not indicating an occupation (litsa, ne imeiushchie iii ne ukazatshie zaniatii).
Soviet censuses have no concept strictly analogous to our "labor force," i.e.
referring to the number of persons working or wanting work during a given week.
The category of "having an occupation" of the 1926 Census is more or less equiva-
lent to that of the "gainful worker" used by the U.S. Census prior to 1940, and
indicates one's general occupational status without reference to any particular
period of time.
The section on "occupations" from the Soviet censuses1937 and 1939 was
similar to that of the 1926 Census. However, data have been released only for
1939 and only from the section on "social groups," which is based on a substantial
modification of the principle of "occupational status," tending to inflate the pro-
portion of the population associated with State as distinct from cooperative and
private economic activity (see I. V. Sautin, Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1939
goda, Moscow, 1939, pp. 55-60).
In the general field of Soviet labor statistics the expression "rabochaia sila,"
usually translated "manpower," refers to the available stock of labor in the sense
of the number of persons expected to work (see, for example, M. Sonin, Voprosy
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Notes to Table 1
aIncludinga small number of cooperative handicraftsmen, not enumerated
separately by the census.
bSincethe census does not give a distribution by agriculture and nonagriculture
for the unemployed, the distribution by rural and urban is used.
C Less than 500.
Source: Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda, Moscow, TsSU, 1928-1931,
Vol. XXXIV, pp. 2-3 and 8-12.
(14.5 per cent of self-employed workers, 30.7 per cent of wage and
salary workers and 40.9 per cent of the unemployed); but taken
together, females constituted almost half (46.7 per cent) of the civilian
•labor force.
• The relatively high percentage of females reflects in part the deficit
in the number of males relative to females in the adult population—
5.3 million in the total population sixteen years and over and 4.8 million
• in the rural." The deficit appears to have been an effect of World
War I, the Revolution, and the Civil War, since the population at the
time of the 1897 census showed almost no deficit.'4
More important is the fact that the proportion of the female popula-
tion in the labor force was exceptionally high. As shown in Table 2,
75.5 per cent of the female population age sixteen to fifty-nine were in
the labor force. The percentage was- much higher for the population
dependent on agricultural than on nonagricultural occupations. Of the
female population age sixteen to fifty-nine dependent on agricultural
occupations, 87.9 per cent were in the labor force, compared to 36.7
per cent of the female population age sixteen to fifty-nine dependent
on nonagricultural occupations.
The percentage of the total female population in the labor force
exceeds that for all other countries listed in a recent compendium of
the United Nations,15 where in no case is the proportion of females
• age twenty to sixty-four who are "economically active" greater than
•49.9 (Japan). Only in certain eastern European countries does the
proportion approach that of the U.S.S.R.16
• The high labor force percentages among Soviet males shown in
Table 2, on the other hand, are not In 1926, 98.6 per cent
of the male population age sixteen to fifty-nine dependent on agricul-
13 Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda, 'Volume XVII.
14 Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi lmperii 1897 goda, St. Peters-
burg, TsSK, 1905, Summary Volume.
15 Demographic Yearbook 1948, United Nations, 1949,Pp. 232-233.
16 "A Comparison of the Gainfully Occupied Population by Sex and Age in the
Various Countries of the World," International Labour Review, May 1940, pp.
541-550.
17 ibid.
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TABLE 2
The Labor Force and the Economically Active as a Percentage of the










10-15 58.2 66.8 9.1 69.3 12.8 59.5 67.5 14.6




















10-15 60.6 69.1 9.7 71.8 16.2 62.0 69.9 15.9
16-59 95.6 98.2 86.3 98.6 93.5 97.2 98.5 92.9
60 and over 74.9 77.5 57.9 78.6 71.7 78.3 78.6 76.1
o andover • 63.7 64.8 58.6 66.2 62.3 65.1 65.3 64.1
Female:
10-15 55.9 64.4 8.4 66.8 8.9 57.3 65.0 13.3
16-59 75.5 85.5 35.7 87.9 36.7 76.6 85.8 40.1
60 and over 38.6 44.0 11.4 45.7 15.0 42.8 45.6 28.1
o andover 51.6 57.5 24.0 59.9 24.2 52.6 57.8 28.4
Source: Vsesoiuznaia perepis' na.s'eleniia 1926 goda, TsSU, 1928-1931, Vol. XXXIV.
tural occupations were in the labor force, and 93.0 per cent of those
dependent on nonagricultural occupations.
The high labor force percentages for females reflect a distinguishing
feature of the economic life of the countryside in pre-Soviet Russia as
well as in the Soviet Union of the preplan era, namely, that women
worked in the fields alongside 'their husbands. Indeed, most able-bodied
members of the family, regardless of age, did a share of the work when
the season required it.'8 Nevertheless, the indicated percentages are so
high that a question is raised whether they may include some persons
who should really be classed as dependents within the meaning of the
census instructions.
According to the instructions, the word of the respondent sufficed to
indicate an occupation, including work as an unpaid family member,
except that in the latter case, work was supposed to have been "regular"
and in connection with the principal occupation of the head of the
family. There was no precise frame of reference, from the standpoint
either of measuring period, amount of income or hours of work. In other
words, "having an occupation" referred to one's general or usual
status.'9
18 For example, John Maynard, The Russian Peasant; and Other Studies, Gol-
Iancz, 1947, p. 22.
'9 For comments on the subject of "occupation" in Soviet labor force analysis,
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One did not have to be working at the time of the census (December
17, 1926) in order to be counted as having an occupation, providing
seasonal work was reported "of a permanent character [which] occurs
year after year."2° This held not only for cases where the family was
the economic unit, but also where persons worked (seasonally) for hire;
for example, "construction workers [rabochie] must indicate their sum-
mer work. .. eventhough at the moment of the census they are not
so occupied." In the case of persons with more than one occupation,
a summer seasonal job bringing the major income for the year was
listed as the principal occupation, even though the individual was
otherwise occupied at the time of the census.
Persons "completely without work and seeking it" at the time of the
census, including those who never worked before, were registered as
unemployed. However, judging from tables on principal and second-
ary occupations, persons reporting seasonal summer work but seeking
work in December, were registered as "occupied" in the summer job
and not as unemployed.21
The absence of a quantitative standard in terms of money earned
or hours worked raises the possibility that persons working relatively
little throughout the year would nevertheless be counted as occupied.
The possibility is especially evident with respect to unpaid family
workers, although the clear intent of the census is to include only those
who "help" in the fullest sense of the word:22
"In the category of family members helping in the occupation are
included those who regularly [postoianno] help the head of their own
family by their work in his craft or occupation; and as helping family
members in agriculture, persons, regardless of age, who take part in
the principal agricultural work (field work, threshing, pasturage of
cattle, etc.), even though also working in the home."
see note 12, above; and for a general discussion of methods and concepts in this
field, see A. J. Jaffe and Charles D. Stewart, Manpower Resources and Utilization:
Principles of Working Force Analysis, Wiley, 1951.
20Vsesoiuznala perepi.i' naseleniia 1926 goda, Supplement to Volumes XVIII-
XXXIV, pp. 10-11.
21 Ibid., Volume XXXIV, pp. 118-119. This may explain why the census total
of unemployed (1,014,000) is less than the yearly average number registered in
fiscal year 1926-1927 (1,242,000)as well as the number on April1, 1927
(1,478,000), although seasonal factors distinguishing December from April may
also be involved. Unemployment data from Soviet sources in Schwarz, op.cit.,
p. 38. It seems probable, furthermore, that the census underenumerated persons
with a seasonal occupation for hire in agriculture but not working (and not un-
employed) at the time of the census (see Warren W. Eason, "The Agricultural
Labor Force and Population of the U.S.S.R., 1926-1941," Rand Corporation, hecto-
graphed, RM-1248, May 4, 1954).
22 Vsesoiuznaia perepis' riaselenila 1926 goda, Supplement to Volumes XVIII-
XXXIV, p. 10.
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The difficulty of delineating regular work from irregular or occa-
sional, and housework from farm work, is recognized in another section
of the instructions :23
"Membersof the family helping in the occupation introduce ele-
ments characteristic, chiefly, of the peasant economy, and to a certain
degree of trade and handicrafts. In this group is included wives and
daughters and sons who have not left the household, regularly help-
ing the head of the family in the principal agricultural work; and
also the sons of artisans working together with the father in the
handicraft as an apprentice, as well as wives working over the counter
in the shops of their husbands.
"For the most part, we have here a case of labor which is insuf-
ficiently differentiated, and which stands on the border between pro-
fessional labor and the home economy (female work and peasant
economy). The fact that they are actually working, under the direc-
tion of a primary person, places them in the production process, but
the filial or marital connection with the head of the economic unit
makes their social position different from the position of persons
working for hire."
It will be noticed that the emphasis is on regular participation in the
principal work of the head of the family, and the census goes further
to demand a straightforward indication to the enumerator of help in
the principal occupation on the part of the family member.
It is clear that the census instructions were formulated to include in
the labor force only persons with more than a transient or casual rela-
tionship to it, although not necessarily working a full year, or even a
full agricultural year. In fact, since the demand for labor in agriculture
is concentrated in a few months of the year, it would seem that rela-
tively little work on an annual basis would suffice for compliance with
the spirit of the instructions. Subject to the qualification that the results
may embody wide variation in the amount of work per year and per
day in the given case, therefore, the census probably gives a fairly
accurate measure of the number of persons "having an occupation."
We now ask what effect the Plans may have had on the percentage
of the population in the labor force. Unfortunately, comprehensive
figures on the total labor force of the U.S.S.R. have not been released
since the Five-Year Plans began. The 1937 census was officially abro-
gated shortly after it was taken;24 and although tabulation was sub-
sequently completed,25 the results have never admittedly been pub:.
23Ibid.,p. 12. 24Izvestiia,September 26, 1937.
25Testimonyof a former Soviet demographer now in this country.
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lished. Releases from the 1989 census, on the other hand, have been
confined to population data with partial detail, including a classification
by social groups which is only of indirect aid m deriving labor force
figures. Soviet estimates of the total labor force after 1929 from non-
census sources have never been published. In the absence of adequate
data on the total labor force, therefore, any indication of the change
in the percentage of the population in the labor force must be to a
certain extent speculative.
Under the conditions of the Five-Year Plans, certain factors would
appear to have increased the percentage of the population in the labor
force and others to have decreased it; but on balance, the effect has
probably been to decrease the percentage to some degree. Tending to
decrease it would be the increase in the number of students and the
large-scale migration of females from rural to urban areas. Tending to
increase it would be the efforts of the Soviet government to get the
maximum proportion, of the adult population into the labor force; the
increase in the population age sixteen to fifty-nine relative to other
groups; and possibly the indirect effects of the fall in real wages, which
were low before the Plans and which apparently remained below
the 1928 level until as recently as 1952.26 These factors will now be con-
sidered briefly, and an indication will be given of their effect on the
percentage in the labor force at the time of the 1939 census.
Increase in School Attendance. The number of students, excluding
those in universities, rose from 41.5 per cent of the population age eight
to sixteen in 1928-1929 to 89.6 per cent in which would
imply that the contribution of youths to the labor force at the same
time decreased. However, for comparability with the concepts of the
1926 census, students continuing to supply seasonal labor would be
considered occupied. Although urban youths attending school may not
as a rule have worked during the summer28—as seems to have been the
case even in 1926, judging by the relatively small percentage in the
labor force29—youths from collective farms (as well as other rural
26 Janet G. Chapman, "Real Wages in the Soviet Union, 1928-1952," The Re-
view of Economics and Statistics, May 1954, pp. 134-156.
27 The number of students in 1928-1929 (12,548,000) relative to the popula-
tion age 8-16 from the 1926 census (30,257,000); the number of students in 1938-
1939 (32,711,000) relative to the population age 8-16 from the 1939 census
(36,519,000) as adjusted by Lorimer (Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet
Union: History and Prospects, Geneva, League of Nations, 1946, P. 141). Children
entered school officially at 8 years of age during this period.
28 From time to time, however, special circumstances may have existed. For
example, during and shortly after World War II, a large number of urban youths
were pressed into working in rural areas during harvest time (see Scbwarz,
op.cit., p. 122).
29 In 1928, 9.1 per cent of urban youths age 10-15 were in the labor force, corn-
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youths) probably did work, either for the collective farm or on the
homestead farm of the household. The increase in school attendance
would thus appear to have had no marked effect on the over-all per-
centage of yduths having an occupation, within the concept of the
1926 census.
Specifically, it would seem that the percentage of the population age
twelve to fifteen in the labor force (by rural and urban areas) remained
unchanged from 1926, although the percentage of children age, ten to
eleven probably fell to negligible proportions.3°
Rural-Urban Migration of Females. In 1926, 85.5 per cent of the
rural female population age sixteen to fifty-nine and 40.1 per cent of
the urban were in the labor force. A differential of this magnitude main-
tained throughout the 1930's would mean that rural-urban migration
of between 11 and 14 million females by including a relatively
high percentage of adults, would have a downward effect on the per-
centage of the total female population age sixteen to fifty-nine eco-
nomically active.
It is felt that the percentage of the rural population age sixteen to
fifty-nine in the labor force has not changed significantly since 1926.
This conclusion is reached by ruling out, for different reasons, the
possibility of an increase or decrease. An increase is ruled out because
the 1926 percentage (85.5) would seem to represent more or less an
upper limit consonant with a minimum number of females attending
full time to home and family obligations. A decrease is ruled out on
the grounds that certain basic conditions of rural economic life had
not changed, namely, the low standard of living and family type agri-
culture retained in the form of the homestead garden plot. Finally, it
may be noted that only a fraction of the total number of dependents
of institutions and persons receiving "unearned income" were in rural
areas.32 It is therefore assumed that 85.5 per cent of the rural female
population age sixteen to fifty-nine were in the labor force in 1939.
pared to 66.8 per cent of rural ( Vsesoiuznaia perepLs' naseleniia 1926 goda, Volume
XXXIV).
The evidence for an unchanged percentage of the rural population age 12-15
in the labor force is the relatively large number of youths age 12-15 earning labor-
clays on collective farms (see Eason, "The Agricultural Labor Force and Popula-
tion of the U.S.S.R., 1926-1941,p. 25). The evidence for assummg a negligible
number age 10-11 is,first, that the percentage of children age 10-11 in the
labor force in 1926 must have been very small (but cannot be determined
exactly because the age-group 10-14 is reported as a unit); and, second, that all
discussion of the labor of children and youths on the collective farms during the
1930's was confined to those age 12-15 (although there was no age limit on the
earning of labor-days).
31 Eason, "Population and Labor Force," Appendix B,P. 30.
32 Of 1.9 million in this group (see Table 1), 1.5 mfflion were in urban areas.
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In the case of urban females age sixteen to fifty-nine, it is generally
presumed that the percentage in the labor force increased during the
Five-Year Plans in response to the efforts by the government to get
females into the wage and salary group. The presumption seems to be
borne out by the reported increase in the number of female wage and
salary workers, from 2.9 million at the time of the 1926 census to
10.7 million on January 1, 1939, or from 30.7 to 37.4 per cent of both
sexes (see Table 3, below).
However, this increase arose not only from an increase in the per-
centage of the urban female population in the labor force, but also from
the absolute increase in the urban female population and from the
proportionate shift of females in the labor force from a nonhired to a
hired status. The last two factors alone could have accounted for
almost all of the increase in the number of wage and salary workers
between 1926 and 1939, if it is assumed (1) that the rural-urban
distribution of the reported number of female wage and salary workers
in nonagricultural sectors was the same in 1939 as in 1926 and (2) that
the proportion of the urban labor force in nonhired occupations was
relatively small. On this basis, it may be assumed that about 40 per
cent of the urban female population age sixteen to fifty-nine in 1939
was in the labor force, compared to 35.7 per cent in
However, if in fact the percentage was higher than 40 in 1939, it
In 1926, 72 per cent of female wage and salary workers lived in urban areas
(Vsesoiuznaia naseteniia 1926 goda, Vol. XXXIV). The same proportion in
1939 would mean that 7.4 million female wage and salary workers lived in urban
areas. On the assumption that 40 per cent of the urban female population age 16-59
were in the labor force, this would be about 85 per cent of the urban female labor
force, while if 50 per cent of the urban female population age 16-59 were in the
labor force, the proportion of female wage and salary workers in the urban female
labor force would be about 65 per cent.
In 1926, 52 per cent of the urban female labor force were wage and salary
workers. The percentage would be expected to be higher in 1939 through the
switch of certain occupations from a nonhired to hired status. Data on the non-
agricultural nonhired labor force for 1939 are very poor, but the impression con-
veyed in Soviet sources is that the number was proportionately much smaller than
in 1926. According to this, the proportion of the urban (female) labor force in
the wage and salary group was relatively large, which would be more consistent
with the higher estimate above (85) than the lower (65). The assumption that 40
per cent of the urban female population age 16-59 in 1939 were in the labor force
is made on this basis.
The assumption is obviously not well supported, but it conforms to available
evidence better than any alternative. The principal weakness lies in the grounds
for assuming that the number of persons in the nonhired urban labor force was
relatively small; in fact, the percentage could have been higher than the Soviets
are willing to admit. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the estimates of
the urban population for 1939 by age-groups are subject to a considerable margin
of error.
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would imply one or more of the following conditions: (1) a higher
proportion of female nonagricultural wage and salary workers residing
in urban areas in 1939 than in 1926, (2) a larger number of female
private artisans (noncooperative handicraftsmen) than indicated by
partial information presently available, (3) a relatively large number of
females temporarily unemployed or not in the labor force, or (4) a
relatively large number in urban nonreported sectors. Except for (1),
which is felt to be unlikely on the basis of indirect evidence,34 and the
inadequate fragmentary data on (2), there is no direct information
on these categories in Soviet sources.
Government Efforts and General Conditions Operating to Increase
Percentage of Population in Labor Force. The existence of these pres-
sures has already been indicated and need not be elaborated.35 The
salient factor concerning their effect is that the percentage of the
population in the labor force in 1926 was a]ready very and in
the case of rural areas, high enough to leave little room for expansion.
The percentage of the rural male population age sixteen to fifty-nine
in the labor force (98.2) could exclude only those physically and
mentally incapable of work, and, as noted above, the percentage of
the female (85.5) would seem to exclude only the minimum number
required for household and family duties. For all practical purposes,
therefore, an increase in the percentage of the adult rural population
in the labor force does not seem plausible.
In urban areas, the percentage of the male population age sixteen
to fifty-nine in the labor force is assumed to have increased from the
1926 level (86.3) to 97.1, an estimated figure which purports to include
all those physically and mentally capable of work (see Appendix Table
A-i). The percentage of the urban female population age sixteen to
fifty-nine in the labor force, as discussed above, is assumed equal
to 40. The percentage of males and females sixty years of age and
over in the labor force (rural and urban) is assumed unchanged.
The foregoing discussion suggests possible change in the age-specific
proportion of the urban and rural population in the labor force under
the Five-Year Plans. In Appendix C and Table 4, the proportions as-
sumed above are applied to the urban and rural population by age
84If anything, the proportion of the female nonagricultural wage and salary
workers living in urban areas may have declined by 1939, or, in other words, the
proportion in rural areas may have increased. This observation is based on the fact
that the nonagricultural proportion of the total rural population apparently in-
creased between 1926 and 1939 (see Warren W. Eason, "Population Growth and
Economic Development in the U.S.S.R.," to be published in the proceedings of the
World Population Conference, 1954).
For a further discussion of the subject, see Schwarz, op.cit., Chap. II.
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and sex to derive a hypothetical labor force at the time of the 1939








Labor force (thousands) 84,357 94,019 11.5
Labor force as per cent of population57.5 55.2
Male:
Labor force (thousands) 45,218 52,938 17.1
Labor force as per cent of male
population 63.7 64.8
Female: .
Labor force (thousands) 39,139 41,081 5.0
Labor force as per cent of female
population 51.6 46.3
The higher percentage of the male population in the labor force in
1939 reflects predominantly the assumption of a higher percentage of
the urban male population age sixteen to fifty-nine in the labor force.
The lower percentage of the female population in the labor force
shows the effect of rural-urban migration only partly balanced by the
assumption of an increase in the percentage of urban females age
sixteen to fifty-nine in the labor force. The percentage increase in the
total labor force (11.5) is somewhat less than the percentage increase
in the population (15.9), in spite of the larger proportion of adults in
the population, because of the assumptions concerning the percentage
of. children age ten to eleven and youths age twelve to fifteen in
the labor force and the net effect of rural-urban migration.
3. Labor Force by Reported Groups
Although information is not available on the total labor force under
the Five-Year Plans, as discussed in the preceding section, data by
certain of the most important occupation groups have been reported,
but with diminishing frequency and consistency. During the inter-
censal period, the following were the major developments in the size
and distribution of the labor force by these groups:
1. The number of wage and salary workers tripled, from. 9.6 million
according to principal occupation at the time of the 1926 census, to
28.6 million employed on January 1, 1939. The expansion of industry,
construction, transportation, education, and administration, carried out
by state enterprises working with hired labor, accOunted for virtually
all of the increase. The number of wage and salary workers in agricul-
ture (after the early 1930's these were associated with state farms
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and machine-tractor stations) declined from 13 per cent of the total
in 1926 to 7 per cent in 1939.
2. The number of self-employed and unpaid family workers was
drastically reduced by the collectivization of agriculture and the
expansion of the producer cooperative network, as well as by the
movement of. labor into the wage and salary group. The number of
self-employed fell from 72.1 million in 1926 to less than 4 million
individual farmers and a relatively small number of private artisans in
1939. Within the collective farm organization, however, the existence
of the individual homestead garden plot, attracting considerable full-
and part-time labor from the members of the household, has meant
the continuation de facto of a relatively large amount of "self-employ-
ment," principally among females.
3. There was an increase in the number of persons earning "labor
shares," especially the number earning trudodni (labor-days) as col-
lective farmers, but also those earning zarabotki as members of pro-
ducer cooperatives. By 1939, roughly half of the total labor force
earned one or more labor shares during the year, although a large
number of collective farmers also earned wages (from work outside
the collective farm) and self-employment income (from work on the
homestead farm).
4. The number of persons on active duty with the military increased
after the middle 1930's, and by early 1939 (before the widening of mili-
tary activity later in the year) was near 1.6 million, or almost triple the
level at the time of the 1926 census.36
These over-all trends did not develop in a regular fashion. On the
contrary, the growth of the various sectors was extremely irregular,
related to fundamental changes in the economic system. In describing
the salient features of the period, the following stages may be differen-
tiated: 1928-1930, inclusive; the year 1931; 1932-1936, inclusive; and
1937 until the annexation of territory and the start of World War II
in 1939.
From the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan to the end of 1930,
the total number of wage and salary workers increased by an amount
somewhat greater than projected by the Plan, reaching 15.6 million
on January 1, 1931, as against 13.8 million planned for fiscal year
The planned increase in the number of wage and salary
workers, incidentally, was deliberately set below the average annual
increase over the preceding five years.
Eason, "Population and Labor Force," as cited, p. 108 and Appendix A, Table
"Piatiletniiplan nafodno-khoziaistvennogo stroitel'stva, Moscow, Gosplan, 1930.
Volume II, Part 2, p. 165.
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The number of registered unemployed increased initially during the
Plan, from 1.4 million on October 1,' 1928 to 1.7 million on April 1, 1929,
and then decreased to 1.1 million on April 1, 1930.38
Inspite of some correspondence between the planned and actual
increases in the number of wage and salary workers from 1928 through
1930, and the continued existence of unemployment, labor shortages
apparently developed in certain areas. Measures to get the unemployed
to work and to ensure adequate manpower for expanding industry
were discussed with increasing frequency.3° To this end, on October 9,
1930, unemployment insurance was abolished, and the state labor
exchanges were told to "take all steps necessary to put the unemployed
to work at once,"4° even though this meant accepting work outside one's
specialty which might have been refused given the alternative of
insurance. From that moment to the present, unemployment has offi-
cially not existed in the U.S.S.R.
Immediately thereafter—although only partly if at all due to the
abolition of unemployment insurance—the number of wage and salary
workers rose sharply. As shown in Table 3, the increase during 1931
was 6.3 million, starting from 15.6 million on January 1. and reaching
21.5 million on October 1 and 21.9 miffion on January 1 of the next
year. This increase by more than 30 per cent in one year was equal in
absolute terms to that over the preceding four.
The exceptional growth in the number of wage and salary workers
during 1931 was undoubtedly an indirect result of the major and
irreversible moves toward collectivization in agriculture which took
place at the end of 1930 and throughout 1931. The adverse reaction
of many of the peasants to collectivization would appear to have
motivated a large number to seek work in the cities. Following a sharp
rise and fall in early 1930,41 the number of collective farms grew from
85,000 on July 1, 1930, to 230,000 a year and a half later. The related
increase in the number of collectivized households did not begin until
1931, when in the course of the year it went from 6.6 million to 15.4
million, or from 26.4 to 62.6 per cent of all households in
The population of collective farms increased from 4.8 million in 1929 to
68.7 million in 1932, and the number of able-bodied members sixteen
years of age and over, from 2.3 million to 42.1 miffion.43
88Seenote 21. SeeSchwarz, op.cit., Chap. IL
40Izvestiia,October 11, 1930.
41BetweenFebruary and March, 1930, the number of collective farms increased
from 87,500 to 110,200, and the number of collective farm households from 8
million to 14 million; then, responding to official objections to the speed of col-
lectivization, the respective numbers fell by May to below the February levels
(see Eason, "The Agricultural Labor Force and Population of the U.S.S.R., 1926-
1941," Table B-i in Appendix B, p. 122).
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Rural-urban migration statistics and data on the growth of the




Year January la during Year Migrationb
1928 27,571 59 1,062
1929 27,830 3,270 1,392
1930 30,900 1,100 2,633
1931 32,000 4,340 4,100
1932 36,340 3,399 2,719
1933 39,739 1,361 772
1934 41,100
aWarrenEason, "Population Growth and Economic Development in the
U.S.S.R.,"to be published in the proceedings of the World Population Conference,
Table 2.
b stroltel'.stoo SSSR, 1936, Moscow, TsUNKhU, 1936, p. 545.
The several years following 1931 were relatively stable. The average
number of wage and salary workers was lower in 1933 than in 1932, but
increased by somewhat over 1 million per year thereafter until 1939.
The number in nonagriculture fell off after 1931 and then recovered;
however, it did not rise significantly above the level of January 1,
1932, until 1937 (see Table 3).
The number of wage and salary workers in agriculture, i.e. on state
farms and machine-tractor stations,44 had grown more rapidly in 1931
than the number in nonagriculture. This growth continued in the 1931-
1934 period, when the number of nonagricultural wage and salary
workers remained more or less constant, and reflected the planned
effort to widen the share of state relative to collective and individual
farming. By the mid-1930's, however, the poor record of state farms
had led to a process of contraction,45 which appears as an absolute
decline in the number of wage and salary workers in agriculture after
1934, to the 1931 level by 1939.
In collectivized agriculture, following 1931 the absolute number of
collective farm households did not increase again until the beginning
"Only the permanent staff of the Machine-Tractor Stations is included, seasonal
labor being supplied by collective farms, for the most part, and paid in labor-days.
Through the summer of 1932, the number of wage and salary workers in agri-
culture included a significant number working for hire on individual farms (see
ibid., Appendix C, p. 143).
Naum Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.: Plans and Perform-
ance, Stanford University Press, 1949, P. 254ff.
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of 1935.46However,collectivized households as a percentage of the
total (in agriculture) continued to increase as a result of the decrease
in the number of individual farm households. This led, through the
movement of population into existing collective farm households and
a rise in the average population per household, to a continuous increase
in the collective farm population, reaching a prewar peak near
100 million in
Following 1936, for reasons which are not entirely clear, the labor
force and population of collective farms dropped sharply, primarily
through a decline in the number of males sixteen years of age and
over. The number fell from 25.3 million in 1936 to 20 million in 1937
and 18.5 million in 1938, for an over-all decline of almost 7 million
in two years, while the corresponding number of females changed very
little. The number of males earning labor-days fell by 4 million—less
than the decrease in the total because fewer were earning no labor-
days.48
In an attempt to explain the drop in the number of males, the fol-
lowing factors are considered relevant, although they do not necessarily
add up to a completely satisfactory explanation:
1. Because 1936 was a year of relatively poor harvest, a large number
of males may have moved from the farms to the cities. If this were
true, however, one would expect to see an increase in the number of
male wage and salary workers; and although there was an increase,
it was a modest one. Between the end of 1936 and the beginning of
1939, the number of male wage and salary workers increased by less
than 1 million.
2. Theoretically, expansion of the military could account for a
certain number, but the increase prior to 1939 was only about 580,000
and took place during
3. During 1937 and 1938, many official protests were registered
concerning large-scale expulsions from collective farms the year before
for "trivial" reasons. Laws were established stipulating the conditions
for expulsion and listing the relatively minor offenses which could not
thereafter be considered as Here too, one would expect a rise
in other sectors of the labor force, unless the expulsions, however
"trivial," justffied imprisonment—and we have no data on the size
of the prison population.
46Eason,"The Agricultural Labor Force and Population of the U.S.S.R., 1926-
1941," Table B-i in Appendix B, p. 122.
Ibid.,p. 17. 48Ibid.,p. 25.
Eason, "Population and Labor Force," Appendix A, p. 2, note g.
Eason, "The Agricultural Labor Force and Population of the U.S.S.R., 1926-
1941," p. 29.
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4. Entering the group sixteen years of age and older between 1933
and 1937 were persons born during World War I, the Revolution, and
the Civil War, when the birth rate was low.51 This presumably could
have at least slowed down the rate of natural increase of the collective
farm population sixteen years of age and older, although it does not
explain the differential change between males and females.
5.Finally,it should be noted that where the decline involved
persons already working much of the year for hire outside the collective
farm, their quitting the farm entirely and working full time for hire
would have a relatively small effect on the yearly average number of
wage and salary workers. Perhaps 1 or 2 million persons fell into this
category.52
In any event, during 1939 and 1940 the number of males on collective
farms continued to decline, by about 1 million each year; but in these
years there was a parallel in the number of male wage and
salary workers and in the military.
Turning once again to the intercensal period as a whole, what
general conclusions can be reached concerning the labor force trends
outlined above?
First, we may aggregate the data by reported groups as of January,
1939, and, allowing for double counting and seasonal fluctuations,
arrive at a total which is conceptually more or less consistent with that
of the 1926 census. This total, which will be called the "reported labor
force" for 1939, is 84.3 miffion (see Table 4)—almost identical to the
total labor force in 1926. The number of males is about 1 million
greater than in 1926 and the number of females 1 million less.
The fact that the "reported labor force" in 1939 is not very different
from the total labor force in 1926 does not necessarily imply a rejection
of the hypothetical increase in the labor force proposed in the pre-
ceding section, from 84 million to 94 million. The difference of 10 mil-
lion between the reported and the hypothetical totals for 1939 could
be due to statistical shortcomings in the original data, to estimating
and aggregating errors, and to the nonreporting of certain sectors,
notably forced labor.53
51Lorimer,op.cit., p. 41.
52Between1938 and 1937, of the total decline of 5.3 million in the number of
able-bodied males 16 years of age and over, more than 3 million occurred in
groups earning more than 51 labor-days per year. The latter are generally not
considered to work for hire to any great extent, if at all, and many persons earning
less than 51 labor-days do not work much for hire (Eason, "The Agricultural Labor
Force and Population of the U.S.S.R., 1926-1941," pp. 27 and 181-192).
58Attemptsto measure these factors are not very successful. Possibilities in this
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This makes it difficult to establish and analyze certain basic trends
in the growth of the Soviet labor force. Consider, for example, the
shift from agricultural to nonagricultural employment. Using the
reported labor force for 1939, the increase in the nonagricultural sectors
of about 17 million compared to 1926, is balanced by an equal decline
in the agricultural sectors." Using the hypothetical labor force, on
the other hand, which would mean increasing both the. agricultural
and nonagricultural components (relative to the reported labor force)
by, say, 5 million,55 the absolute increase in the nonagricultural com-
ponent over the intercensal period, rather than being equal to the
decline in the agricultural, would be almost twice as great in absolute
terms.
We can minimize such difficulties arising from our inability to
estimate the total labor force accurately and at the same time gain
some insight into the fundamental growth relationships of the labor
force under the Five-Year Plans by concentrating attention on wage
and salary workers. The wage and salary sector, since it includes the
bulk of the industrial labor force and has been a priority sector from
the standpoint of manpower allocation, is an important index of the
impact of industrialization on the growth and distribution of the
labor force.
We shall therefore compare trends in the number of wage and salary
workers with those of nonwage and nonsalary workers as a group, and
with trends in the growth and age-sex composition of the population.
The statistical problems are minimized by this procedure because data
on wage and salary workers seem to be more reliable than for other
reported groups.
The expansion of the industrial sector of the economy under the
Plans increased the demand for wage and salary workers. The demand
was satisfied during the 1930's partly by the available supplies of
manpower already in the urban areas, consisting of both the unem-
ployed and persons in other categories of the urban labor force; partly
by the large-scale migration of labor from rural to urban areas; and
partly by the drawing of persons into the labor force. Of these, rural-
urban migration and the transformation of formerly rural communities
connection are discussed in Eason, "Population and Labor Force," Appendix A,
pp. 1-7.
"The data are from the section on the labor force in Table 4, including the
number of wage and salary workers in agriculture from Eason, "Agricultural Labor
Force and Population of the U.S.S.R., 1926-1941," p. 55.
This is but one of many conceivable ways of making the distribution between
agriculture and nonagriculture. In particular, it should be noted that the distribu-
tion with respect to nonreported sectors (including forced labor) could involve
both nonagriculture and agriculture, or the rural economy (e.g. forestry).
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into urban areas appear to have accounted for more than 80 per cent
of the increase in the labor supply of the urban areas.56
•At the same time, the adult population was growing, although the
average rate of growth during the intercensal period was less than
projected (from 1926) on the basis of pre-Plan survival ratios.51 The
events of the early 1930's had caused a temporary but marked decline
in population growth, including a low birth rate and high death rate
for several years.58 Nevertheless, the absolute increase in the adult
population age sixteen to fifty-nine between 1926 and 1939 was at a
rate of 1.5 per cent per year, for a total increase of 16.5 million, corn-
•pared to 18.4 million for wage and salary workers. Allowing for a
certain number of females not entering the labor force, the absolute
increase in the adult population accounts for almost two-thirds of the
increase in the number of wage and salary workers.
Since population growth would therefore seem to have been no
deterrent to the expansion of the wage and salary sector, it is difficult
to explain the pattern of growth in the sector, specifically in the case
of males. Almost the entire intercensal increase of 10.6 million male
wage and salary workers in nonagricultural employment took place by
the end of 1931. During 1931 alone, the number increased from 10.7 to
14.5 million, or by 40 per cent, after which it declined somewhat and
then rose again to the 1932 level; but it did not increase above 15 mil-
lion until the end of 1936, and it increased by only 500,000 during
1937 and 1938.
The increase in the number of female wage and salary workers was
proportionate to males through 1931, i.e. the distribution of the sexes
remained more or less unchanged. But thereafter, in the five-year
period during which the number of males did not increase, the number
of females increased by more than 2 million or 40 per cent; and even
after 1936, the rate of increase of females was greater than that of
males.
An explanation for the relatively low rate of increase of male wage
and salary workers is difficult to find in other reported labor force data.
The number of males in the collective farm labor force declined sharply
after 1936, as shown above; and the individual farm labor force, as
judged by the number of individual farm households, was declining
throughout the 1930's. In each case, the release of males to work for
hire is implied.
•It may also be noted that in the period from 1939 to 1950, the
increase in the number of male wage and salary workers was less by 4
56 S. I. Sul'kevich, Territoriia I naselenle SSSR, Moscow, 1940,p.30.
Lorimer, op.cit.,p. 113.
Eason, "Population GrowthandEconomic Development in the U.S.S.R."
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million than the estimated increase in the male population age sixteen
to fifty-nine, which includes a relatively high allowance for military
deaths during the war. Thus, over the period 1926-1950 as a whole,
the increase in the number of male wage and salary workers was no
greater than the absolute increase in the male population age sixteen
to fifty-nine.
The irregularity of the rate of growth of the industrial labor force
during the 1930's appears as evidence of "hidden unemployment" in
the Soviet economy. It may be argued that if industrial enterprise
managers had been economically prudent, payrolls would not have
increased by such a large amount in one year (1931) and remained
more or less unchanged for several years thereafter. The mass exodus
to the cities in 1931 would seem necessarily to have led to i.memploy-
ment under "normal" conditions.
On the other hand, it is possible to view the "hiding" of manpower
in these years as an investment in training, or at least "indoctrination."
One of the big problems facing the Soviet leaders during the 1930's
was the acclimatization of the peasant migrant to industrial life. In
this sense his inclusion on the payrolls, rather than being left unem-
ployed and forced to return to the countryside, may be viewed as a
contribution tending to balance the negative effects in terms of per
capita productivity.
For later years, the rate of growth of the number of wage and salary
workers gives no clear indication of the existence of "hidden unemploy-
ment," except perhaps in the case of the fourth Five-Year Plan (1945-
1950). There the planned increase was overfulfilled by 75 per cent,59
but this could have been the result of an incorrect estimate of the needs
of industry (in recovering from the war and in further expansion) on
the part of the planners, as much as of the excessive hiring of labor.
4. Percentage Utilization of the Labor Force
The discussion thus far has been concerned primarily with trends
in the size and distribution of the "labor force," defined to include
the number of persons having an occupational status. According to
this definition, it will be recalled, persons in agriculture, for example,
were considered "occupied" even though actually working only a
fraction of the year because of seasonal variation in work requirements.
The labor force by occupational status would thus normally be
greater than the average number of persons actually working or
employed at any one time during the year; and in a predominantly
agricultural economy such as the Soviet Union before the Five-Year
Eason, "Population and Labor Force," p.112.
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Plans, the difference between the two figures could be large. This part
of the paper presents a measure of the average number of persons
working or employed in the Soviet Union in 1926 and in 1938, and
examines the trends in the percentage utilization of the labor force
which the measures reveal. The question of unemployment is also
discussed.
According to a survey of peasant households for the year 1924-1925
(March-February), the average number of persons working per day
during the year, calculated from primary data on days of labor, was
equal to 55.3 per cent of the total labor supply of individual peasants
and wage and salary workers (in agriculture)Workingtime is
exclusive of housework, but includes in addition to agriculture, nonagri-
cultural pursuits within the rural economy. These are supplementary
to agriculture, for the most part, such as handicrafts, but also include
work for hire. The average number of persons working in agriculture
alone was equal to 34.8 per cent of the total.
If we apply the average percentages by sex calculated from the
survey to the labor force principally in agriculture according to the
1926 census (Table 1) ,61andadd the number of wage and salary
workers and self-employed and family workers principally occupied in
nonagricultural employment, as well as the military—on the assump-
tion that persons in nonagricultural employment were by and large
"working" or "employed" throughout the year—the result is an estimate
of the average number of persons working or employed during 1926
of 50.4 million, equal to 59.7 per cent of the total labor force.
The Soviet government has tried to increase the percentage utiliza-
tion of the total labor supply, in addition to increasing the supply as a,
percentage of the population, through the movement of labor from
agriculture to industry, and through the reduction of seasonal varia-
tion in agricultural labor requirements (by mechanization and im-
proved organization). In the process much of the labor force has been
60L.E. Mints, Agrarnoe perenaselenie i rynok truda SSSR, Moscow-Leningrad,
1929, pp. 22-31.
61Thismethod of applying percentages from the survey to the number of per-
sons from the census may be supported as follows: About 63 per cent of total
time worked according to the survey (34.8/55.3) was in agriculture proper; how-
ever, almost 93 per cent of the rural population according to the census received
their principal source of livelihood from agriculture. In other words, activities
supplementary to agriculture and those strictly nonagricultural performed by mem-
bers of the peasant household, although occupying a substantial portion of total
time worked, constituted by and large a secondary source of livelihood. It is for
this reason that the percentage of total labor going to agriculture from the total
labor supply according to the survey may be used to estimate the number of persons
"working" among the labor force having a principal occupation in agriculture
according to the census.
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"socialized," as seen in the increase in the number of wage and salary
workers (of state enterprises), the collectivization of agriculture, and
the widening of the producer cooperative network; while the number
of persons occupied solely in private economic activity has declined.
The homestead garden plot of collective farmers, tolerated by the
government to avoid further repercussions over collectivization, has
always been considered by the government as subordinate to the work
of the collective farm, although it still attracts a large proportion of
the collective farmer's time; and it was Stalin's view that the home-
stead plot would ultimately be eliminated in favor of
all of agriculture.62
A measure of the average number of persons working or employed
within the reported groups in the late 1930's would include the fol-
lowing: (1) the average number employed in the reported socialized
sectors, defined as the number earning wages and salaries, labor-days
(collective farmers), zarabotki (cooperative handicraftsmen) or mili-
tary stipends; and (2) the average number working in the reported
private sectors, i.e. on the homestead farm and the private farm and
as private handicraftsmen. A measure of this type for 1938 is con-
structed as follows:
Socialized Sectors. The average number of persons earning labor-
days is estimated on the basis of data from a special survey of a small
number of collective farms, converted into all-U.S.S.R. equivalents (see
Appendix Table D-2). The result is then aggregated directly with
employment data from other reported socialized sectors—i.e. the num-
ber of wage and salary workers, which is reported as a yearly average
(from periodic enterprise payroll data); the number of persons hired
by collective farms during July and August, which may be converted
into a yearly average; and the number of cooperative handicraftsmen
and the military, who are assumed "employed" throughout the year.
Private Sectors. The average number of persons working on the
homestead farms is estimated from survey data giving the distribution
of the labor time of members of collective farm The
average number working on private farms and as private handicrafts-
men is assumed the same percentage of the labor force (by sex) as
in 1926.
The resulting aggregatç average number of persons employed (in
socialized sectors) or working (in private sectors) for 1938 is 60.9
62
J•vStalin,"Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," Bol'shevik,
No. 18, 1952, translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, April 18, 1952.
6SProizvoditel'nost'ispol'zovanle truda v kolkhozakh vo vtoroi piatiletke, Mos-
cow and Leningrad, TsUNKhU, 1939, pp. 67-68; and I. Merinov, "Trudovye resursy
kolkhozov i ikh ispol'zovanie," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 3, 1941,
pp. 17-19.
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million or 72.3 per cent of the reported labor force (see Table 4).
In 1926, the average number of persons working or employed in all
sectors was equal to 59.7 per cent of the total labor force.
The reason for the higher rate of participation in 1938 is, first, the
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of the total labor force in 1926 and 33 per cent of the reported labor
force in 1938. Most of this increase took place in nonagricultural em-
ployment, largely by drawing labor from agricultural sectors where
the average rate of participation was relatively low.
Second, the rate of participation in collective and homestead farm
agriculture in 1938 was higher than in private agriculture (and the
related rural economy) in 1926. The average number of persons sixteen
years of age and over earning labor-days or working on the homestead
farm in 1938 was 69 per cent of the total labor force sixteen and over
from collective farm households; while in 1926, the average number
of persons working from peasant households was 55percent of the
total. The combined demands of collective and homestead farm agri-
culture seem to have attracted a higher percentage of work time in
1938 than the demands of private agriculture in 1926. However, the
average number employed on the collective, farm alone was equal to
only 48 per cent of the total.
The indicated increase in the number of wage and salary workers
and the higher rate of participation in agriculture was relatively
greater among females. That is, while the average number of males
working or employed in all reported sectors rose slightly, from 72 per
cent of the labor force in 1926 to 77 per cent of the reported labor force
in 1938, the average number of females rose from 45to66 per cent.
In collective and homestead farming, a relatively greater share of the
labor time of males went to the collective farm proper, and of females
to the homestead farm. According to the survey data on which the
estimates in Table 4 are based, adult females spent about 25 per cent
of their available time on the homestead farm, compared to about
7 per cent for males. This relationship appears in Table 4 as an
estimated average of 5.8 million females working on the homestead
farm compared to 2.0 million males.
On the other hand, males spent about 75percent of their time earn-
ing labor-days and females about 35 per cent. This relationship appears
in Table 4 as an estimated average of 11.5 million males earning labor-
days compared to 7.6 million females. However, the number of males
principally occupied on the collective farm, i.e. earning more than
fifty labor-days during the year, was only slightly higher than the num-
ber of females—17.1 million compared to 15.9 million; while the
number of males earning one or more labor-days was less than the
number of females—20.3 million compared to 21.6 million.64 In other
words, males were in the minority among the total number of persons
°4 Eason, "The Agricultural Labor Force and Population of theU.S.S.R.,1926-
1941," p. 84.
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earning one or more labor-days but, because of a higher rate of par-
ticipation, contributed about 50 per cent more in total labor time to the
collective farm.65
The major portion of time (in days) not spent on the collective farm
or homestead farm, for males, was spent working for hire outside of
the collective farm, such that only about 5 per cent of available time
remained "nonutilized," according to the survey. Females, on the other
hand, spent less time working for hire, and as a result about 30 per cent
of available time was "nonutilized."
The major portion of the "nonutilized" labor time of females was
probably taken up with the activities of the household. In any event,
for both males and females, "nonutilized" time would seem to be spent
neither working (outside the household) nor, in all probability, seek-
ing work.°°
The over-all increase in the percentage utilization of the labor force,
as pointed out, is traceable in part to the relative increase in the social-
ized sectors. Nevertheless, the socialized sectors in Table 4 are
considerably smaller, and the private sectors considerably larger, as
a percentage of the total, than the Soviet government would have us
believe is the case. For example, according to the classification of the
population by "social groups" in the 1939 census, only 3.4 per cent
of the population was listed in private sectors or other marginal groups,
while in Table 4, 21.2 per cent of the reported labor force by principal
occupation, and 17.2 per cent of the average number working or
employed, were in the private sector. The percentages in Table 4 are
higher because homestead farming islisted as private economic
activity. The census treated it as "subsidiary agriculture" and classified
such persons either as collective farmers or, if the case warranted, as
wage and salary workers. In addition, the number of private farmers
is minimized by the census, since only those with no occupation other
than private agriculture were included, while in Table 4 this category
is based on the reported number of individual peasant
65Thesame relationships hold on a month-by-month basis, as may be seen by
comparing Appendix Table D-1 with Table D-2. More females earned one or more
labor-days per month in the summer months, and more males in the winter (D-1);
but the average number of males earning labor-days per day by months was
higher every month of the year (D-2).
66Itis customary for collective farmers seeking work for hire and unable to find
it in the vicinity of the farm, to leave the household temporarily and to live
away (to be in otkhod) while working (or seeking work). Since absence from
the collective farm is reckoned as "utilized" time in the survey, it may be con-
cluded that persons living on the collective farm andnot working (on the collective
or homestead farm or for hire) would also not be seeking work.
Thedifference between the reported labor force and the hypothetical labor
force (11 million), when "distributed" between socialized and private sectors,
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The question of "explicit" unemployment (as distinct from "hidden"
unemployment) in the Soviet Union centers on the seasonal and
frictionalvarieties. Incidentally, a former employee of a Soviet census
bureau currently writing as a refugee in Europe, insists on the existence
of temporary unemployment in the Soviet Union and refers to provi-
sions which were taken in the 1937 census to register it.65
Seasonal labor outside of agriculture is supplied primarily by persons
from collective farm households. Other sources, including private farm
and other rural households, can not be insignificant, however, because
in 1939 about 25 per cent of the rural population was noncollective
In 1938, 4 million males and 1.5 million females from collective farm
households worked for hire (outside the collective farm) at one or
another time during the year, although not all of this work was for
seasonal industries. Nevertheless, the variety of seasonal industries
(e.g. forestry in the winter, construction in the summer) means that
a substantial fraction of aggregate labor working outside the collective
farm was so engaged throughout the year.
Seasonal labor is included in the manpower balance referred to in
the introduction to this paper. In order to link the labor supply
(by areas) with seasonal labor requirements, furthermore, collective
farmers were required to contract for work for hire through the col-
lective farm manager. Absence from the collective farm without the
manager's permission was declared illegal. Nevertheless, in spite of
these regulations, by the late 1930's a major share of labor outside
the collective fanns was contracted for on an individual basis, beyond
direct or indirect controls.7°
A certain amount of temporary unemployment would therefore seem
to be inevitable in the market for seasonal labor, with such a large
portion of the market outside effective controls. Unfortunately, the
data do not permit us even to estimate the number of people involved
at a given time.
The evidence of frictional unemployment during the 1930's centers
on the relatively high rate of labor turnover, as seen in the following
could affect the over-all distribution. However, the percentage in private sectors
would still be significantly larger than that shown by the census, for the reasons
given.
68 P. Galin, Kak proizvodilis' perepisi naseleniia v SSSR, Munich, 1951,p. 18.
69 Eason; "The Agricultural Labor Force and Population of the U.S.S.R., 1926-
1941," p. 105.
70 N. Aristov, "Organizovannyi nabor rabochei sily," Planovoe khoziaistvo, No.
11, 1939, pp. 93ff.
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data for production workers in large-scale industry (turnover as a
































Source: 1928-1935, from Sotsialistieheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR, 1936, Moscow,
TsUNKhU, 1936, p. 531; 1936-1937, not available; 1938-1939, derived from monthly
data for 1938 and the first half of 1939, in S. Trubnikov, "Istochniki komplek-
tovaniia rabochei shy v SSSR," Problemy ekonomiki, No. 8, 1939, p. 138.
Considering that the number of production workers in large-
scale industry at the end of the 1930's was more than 9 million, labor
turnover represents an equivalent of about 8 million persons. Of course,
labor turnover does not necessarily connote frictional unemployment.
But if each instance of turnover were to involve on the average one
month off the payrolls (and looking for work), it would be equivalent
to an average of more than 600,000 persons frictionally unemployed
with respect to large-scale industry at all times. This number is more
than 2 per cent of the total of wage and salary workers (28 million).
Efforts to curb labor turnover and to channel and retain graduates
where they were needed in industry were stepped up markedly in the
late 1930's,7' but the effect on labor turnover cannot be learned from
available information.
This paper has dealt almost exclusively with the period of the 1930's,
because postwar data are inadequate for the type of analysis presented.
Nevertheless, the transformation of Soviet society under the impact of
the Plans, as seen in the collectivization of agriculture and the expan-
sion of state and other cooperative enterprises, had progressed suf-
ficiently far by the end of the 1930's, that many of the impressions
conveyed by the discussion would hold for the more recent period.
However, just before the war, several developments took place
which may have had a significant effect on the utilization of labor:
(1) the requirement of an obligatory minimum number of labor-days
Schwarz, op.clt., Chap. III.
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on the collective farm and (2) the measures prohibiting wage and
salary workers from quitting work without permission.
Starting in 1939, collective farmers were ordered to work a minimum
number of labor-days or face possible expulsion from the collective
farm.72 This may have raised the rate of participation in collective
farm work, but whether it has been at the expense of other activities
(homestead farm or work for hire) or has led to a further increase in
the over-all rate of participation in all types of economic activity is
impossible to say.
In 1940, it was decreed that wage and salary workers could not quit
a job (sickness and retirement excepted) or take a new one without
the permission of plant management.73 The decree was designed to
strengthen labor discipline and reduce labor turnover.
It is unfortunate that we cannot measure the effectiveness of either
decree, but the results of postwar collective farm budget surveys such
as for the prewar used in this paper, have not been released, and
there are no data on labor turnover. The decrees are directed at in
creasing and stabilizing the rate of participation of the labor force.
The dearth of information about their results leaves an important gap
in our understanding of trends in the utilization of labor in the Soviet
Union.
72 Postanovienie TsK VKP(b) I SNK SSSR, May 27, 1989.
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Appendix 13:
Sources of and Commentary to Table 3
The data in Table 3 are from Soviet sources and by estimation, as
summarized below. Sources report the yearly average number of wage
and salary workers for most of the 1930's, as well as selected quarterly
figures. In estimating the number for certain dates, an equation is
used which sets the reported yearly average for a given year (calcu-
lated by Soviet statisticians from daily or monthly payroll data) equal
to the average of the number on January 1 of the given year and the
following year, April 1, October 1, and twice the number on July 1.
The assumption is that the average of the quarterly figures is approxi-
mately equal to the reported yearly average, which can be shown to be
the case in agriculture, where the data are adequate (Warren W. Eason,
"The Agricultural Labor Force and Population of the U.S.S.R.," Ap-
pendix C, p. 135), although it cannot be shown for the total because
a complete set of data is not available for any one year. Since the yearly
average and quarterly number are reported separately in Soviet
sources, the question must be raised as to whether the data are com-
parable to each other; as to whether, for example, the yearly average
number of wage and salary workers for a given year covers the same
enterprises and institutions as the number for January 1. Unfortunately,
except for the data for April 1, 1934-1936, the sum of sector data,
where given, falls short of the reported total by at least a few hundred
thousand, even when the two appear in the same source. However, a
reasonably careful, although preliminary, sector-by-sector comparison
of the data grouping the seasonal and nonseasonal sectors separately,
too detailed to be presented here, indicates that differences are a
function of seasonal and secular movements, and cannot (at least to
any measurable degree) be attributed to varying degrees of com-
prehensiveness.
Sources and derivations of the data may be listed by• the columns
of Table 3:
Total
Yearly average. Both sexes: 1928-1935, Trud v SSSR, statisticheskii
Moscow, TsUNKhU, 1936, p. 10; 1936, Ia. Joffe, SSSR i
kapitalisticheskie Moscow, 1939, p. 90; 1937, Bol'shaia sovetskaia
entsiklopediia, Moscow, 1947, col. 68; 1938, preliminary figure, Sot-
sialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR, 1933-1938, Moscow and Leningrad,
TsUNKhU, 1939, p. 20. Males: derived from the equation relating
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yearly average to quarterly data (above). Females: both sexes minus
males.
Januarg 1. Both sexes: 1931-1937, E. Orlikova, "Zhenskii trud v
SSSR," Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1939, No. 10, p. 113; 1988, assumed 1.016
of April 1 (relationship from corresponding dates for 1937) and derived
simultaneously with it, by means of equation relating yearly average
to quarterly data (above); 1939, Gornyi zhurnal, 1940, No. 3, p. 4.
Males: 1931-1937 and 1939, same sources as both sexes; 1938, on basis
of percentage of females interpolated between January 1, 1937 and
1939. Females: both sexes minus males.
April 1. Both sexes: 1932 and 1933, assumed .95 of the respective
January 1 figure (relationship taken from data for 1934); 1934, derived
from the monthly average for March, 1934 (21,704,000), as given in
TsUNKhU, Trud v SSSR, 1934, ezhegodnik, Moscow, 1935,p. 42,by
assuming the same percentage differential with respect to the March
average (.995) as given for 1935 and 1936; 1935, Trud v SSSR
(1936),p. 31; 1936, Chislennost' izarabotnaia platarabochikhi
sluzhashchikh v SSSR, Moscow, TsUNKhU, 1936,p. 13; 1937,derived
from Trade Union data in Handbook on the Soviet Trade
A. Lozovsky, editor, Moscow, Cooperative Publication Society of
Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1937,p. 19 (see comment below on
utilization of Trade Union data); 1938 and 1939,. assumed .984
(1/1.016) of respective January 1 figure (relationship taken from data
for 1937), and in case of April 1, 1938, derived simultaneously with
January 1, 1938 (see January 1, above). Males and females: derived
below.
Juig 1. Both sexes: 1932-1935 and 1937, derived from equation relat-
ing yearly average to quarterly data (above); 1936, assumed 1.056 of
January 1 (relationship taken from 1937); 1938 and 1939, derived from
following type of Trade Union information in VTsSPS, Statisticheskii
spravochnik, Moscow, 1939, Vypusk III,pp. 4-13:
July 1,1939
Total number of wage and salary workers 28,581,600
Members of unions, among wage and salary workers 22,828,800
Total members of unions, including students 24,338,200
Per cent of members of unions among wage and salary workers82.7%
It is seen that the indicated per cent does not follow from any of the
absolute figures, i.e., wage and salary workers who are members of
Unions (22,828,800) is 79.9 per cent of the total number of wage and
salary. workers (28,581,600); and total Union members including stu-
dents (24,338,200) is 85.2 per cent of the total number of wage and
salary workers.
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The explanation apparently lies in a footnote to the original table,
concerning the comprehensiveness of the data, which states that the
total number of wage and salary workers is from VTsSPS (All-Union
Central Council of Trade Unions), the compiler of the book in which
the figures appear, and that it is less than the number for the corre-
sponding date in the TsUNKhU series, by 700,000-800,000. Since all
other possibilities can be ruled out as inconsistent with one or another
aspect of the given data, the given percentage must relate the total
union membership to the number of wage and salary workers according
to TsUNKhU. The latter is therefore derived as 29,427,000 (24,338,200
÷ .827), or 845,000 greater than the total given by VTsSPS.
A similar calculation for July 1, 1938, using similar data in the same
source, yields 28,175,000 as the TsUNKhU figure, which is 665,000
greater than the total according to VTsSPS (27,510,000).
Males and females (July 1): derived below.
October 1. Both sexes: 1931-1935, derived from Trade Union data in
Trud v SSSR... (1936), p.56, in the manner described above (July 1);
1936, derived from the equation relating yearly average to quarterly
data (above); 1937 and 1938, assumed equal to the number on sub-
sequent January 1, from an inspection of corresponding data for 1935
and 1936. Males and females: derived below.
Agriculture
All data under these columns are from Eason, "The Agricultural
Labor Force and Population of the U.S.S.R., 1926-1941," Appendix C.
Nonagriculture
All data in these columns are obtained by subtracting the number in
agriculture from the total.
Males and Females
Except as indicated for particular cases above, the data in these
columns are derived as follows:
The total number of wage and salary workers by sex is available,
after 1930, only for January 1, 1931-1937 and 1939 (and in addition, for
several years after 1939). The yearly average number of female wage
and salary workers is not given after 1930, nor is the number for dates
other than January 1. However, the distribution of the sexes by certain
sectors of the wage and salary group is• available with varying fre-
quency for dates other than January 1 (but even in these cases, not the
yearly average). of the sector data are available for July 1,
1935, to construct an estimate of the number of male and female wage
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and salary workers for that date. The calculations are too detailed to
be summarized here, but the result is 16,768,000 males and 9,069,000
females, with females 35.1 per cent of both sexes. The latter percentage
is greater than for January 1, 1935 (33.4) or January 1, 1936 (34.0),
showing, in other words, a seasonal increase in the per cent of females
for 1935. A straight-line increase between the two January 1 per-
centages would give 33.7 per cent for July 1, 1935. The estimated
per cent (35.1) is thus 1.04 times the straight-line per cent based on
January 1 data.
With the per cent of females given for January 1, each year after
1930, the per cent of females for July 1 of years other than 1935 is
estimated arbitrarily therefrom, as follows: (1) The per cent for July 1,
1931-1934, inclusive, is assumed to be 1.04 times the calculated straight-
line increase between consecutive January 1 figures. (2) The per cent
for July 1, 1936-1939, inclusive, is assumed to be 1.02 times the calcu-
lated straight-line increase between consecutive January 1 figures, a
factor (1.02) which is less than that for 1935 (1.04), by an arbitrary
degree, in order to reflect the fact that the absolute seasonal increase
in the number of wage and salary workers in agriculture (a major share
of the seasonal sector in the wage and salary worker series) dropped
sharply between 1935 and 1936, signifying a secular decline.
The per cent of females on October 1 and April 1 is assumed the
same as given for the nearest January 1.
Given the number for both sexes the number of males and females for
the first of each quarter is derived from the percentages just discussed.
Appendix C:
Sources and Commentary to Table 4
Table 4 presents the results of aggregating the reported labor force
data according to (1) an estimated distribution by principal occupation
and (2) an estimate of the average number working or unemployed
in each sector. The steps used in the aggregation may be summarized
by the rows of Table 4:
Labor Force by Principal Occupation
Wage and Salary Workers. Number on January 1, 1939 (Table 3)
minus (1) an estimate of those included whose principal occupation
is collective fanner, plus (2) an estimate of those not included whose
principal occupation is wage and salary worker. (1)• and (2) are esti-
mated from the number of collective farmers also working for hire.
The assumption is that, on the average, one-quarter of those principally
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in collective and homestead farm agriculture (4,249,000) were working
for hire at any given time during the year (1,062,000), and under
(1) are subtracted from the number of wage and salary workers; and
that one-quarter of those principally workingfor hire (1,743,000) were
not actually doing so at any given time during the year (435,000), and
under (2) are added to the number of wage and salary workers. The
evidence is that the share of time working for hire is roughly the same
throughout the year (Proizvoditel'nost'..., pp.67-68; and I. Merinov,
"Trudovye resursy kollchozov i ikh ispol'zovanie," Sotsialis'ticheskoe
sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 3, 1941, pp. 17-19), although the assumed
proportion (one quarter/three quarters) is arbitrary, to conform to the
notion of a "principal" occupation, i.e., that which brings in from one-
half to total income.
Collective Farmers. Number earning fifty-one or more labor-days
during the year (Eason, "The Agricultural Labor Force and Popula-
lion of the U.S.S.R., 1926-1941," p. 84).
Collective Farm Hired Laborers. Number working in July and
August, on the assumption that they had no other source of income
(ibid., pp. 198-200).
Cooperative Handicraftsmen and Military. Estimated from Soviet
sources (Eason, "Population and Labor Force," Appendix A, p. 2).
Homestead Farmers (Collective Farm). Those with a principal occu-
pation In collective and homestead agriculture but earning less than
fifty-one labor-days (Eason, "The Agricultural Labor Force and Popu-
lation of the U.S.S.R., 1926-1941,"P. 84).
Private Farmers. Estimated from the reported number of individual
peasant households (ibid., pp. 201-203).
Private Handicraftsmen. Estimated from the population by "social
groups" in the 1939 census (Eason, "Population and Labor Force,"
Appendix A, p. 2).
Average Number Working or Employed
Wage and Salary Workers. Yearly average number for 1938 (Table
3).
Collective Farmers. Average number earning labor-days per day
(Appendix Table D-2).
Collective Farm Hired Laborers. Annual average equivalent of the
number working in July and August.
Cooperative Handicraftsmen and Military. Same as the labor force.
Homestead Farmers (Collective Farm). Estimated as 5.7 per cent
of total males sixteen and over from collective farm households
(18,946,000) and 24.1 per cent of total females (20,713,000). (Per-
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centage data from Proizvoditel'nost' ..., op.cit., pp. 67-68; absolute
numbers from Eason, "The Agricultural Labor Force and Population
of the U.S.S.R., 1926-1941," p. 25). Average number working age
twelve to fifteen is assumed same percentage (19.7) of total number
from collective farm households (8,946,000) as in private agriculture
according to the survey of 1924-1925 (Mints, op.cit., pp. 22-31).
Private Farmers. Assumed same percentage of the labor force as in
1926.
Private Handicraftsmen. Same as the labor force.
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Appendix D
TABLE D-1
Collective Farmers Earning Labor-Days to Any Extent During Each Month
and During Year, by Sex, U.S.S.R., 1938




January 861 448 41315,41010,0685,34216,27110,5165,755
February 887 461 42816,27510,4375,83817,16210,8986,264
March 1,141 593 54819,37411,6677,70720,51512,2608,255
April 1,558 809 74723,48612,89710,56925,02213,70611,316










Percentage Distribution of Sexesa
January 100 65.3 34.7 100 64.6 35.4
February 100 64.1 35.9 100 63.5 36.5
March 100 60.2 39.8 100 59.8 40.2
April 100 54.9 45.1 100 54.8 45.2
May 100 49.6 50.4 100 49.8 50.2
June 100 48.8 51.2 100 49.2 50.8
July 100 49.2 50.8 100 49.5 50.5
August 100 50.0 50.0 100 50.2 49.8
September 100 50.0 50.0 100 50.2 49.8
October 100 50.1 49.9 100 50.3 '49.7
November 100 51.9 48.1 100 51.9 48.1
December 100 57.1 42.9 100 56.8 43.2
Yearly av. 100 53.1 46.9 100 53.0 47.0
Total 100 52.0 48.0 100 47.9 52.1 100 48.4 51.6
aPercentagedistribution for persons age 12-15 by months and for yearly average assumed
the same as for total.
Source: Figures other than total derived from data in a survey of a small number of collective
farms, in Proizvoditel'nost'..., Moscowand Leningrad, TsUNKhU, 1939, Pp. 77-126. The
survey gives the number of persons per on-hand household earning labor-days to any extent
each month of the year, as well as for the year as a whole. Monthly data as a percentage of
annual are then multiplied by the total, above, for all collective farms to derive monthly data
in this table.
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TABLE D-2
Collective Farmers Earning Labor-Days per Day during Each Month and during Year,
by Sex, U.S.S.R., 1938




January 231 120 11110,6617,8602,80110,8927,9802,912
February 232 121 11110,6097,7292,88010,8417,8502,991
March .288 150 13813,0859,3123,773.13,3739,4623,911
April 391 203 18816,85411,2325,62217,24511,4355,810
May 563 293 27021,32412,0829,24221,88712,3759,512
June 853 443 41023,13512,58810,54723,98813,03110,957
























Yearly av. 823 324 29918,46411,1587,306
Percentage Distribution ot Sexesa
19,08711,4827,605










































November 100 63.3 36.7 100 83.0 37.0
December 100 68.6 31.4 100 68.2 31.8
Yearly av. 100 52.0 48.0 100 60.4 39.6 100 60.1 39.9
a Percentagedistribution for persons age 12-15 by months and for yearly average assumed
the same as for total in Table D-1.
Source: Data in this table are derived from survey of a small number of collective farms,
in Proiztoditel'nost'..., Moscowand Leningrad, TsUNKhU, 1939, pp. 77-126. The survey
gives the number of days worked per on-hand household each month and total for year, as well
as total number of persons working any days. Percentage relationships between the three types
of data are then converted to equivalents, given the total number of persons working
one or more labor-days from all collective farms (Appendix Table D-1).
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COMMENT
M. Library of Congress
On the eve of World War II, the Soviet government was continuing
its efforts to include in the ranks of the workers and employees (wage
and salary earners) as many housewives as possible, but at the same
time the Soviet authorities were the first to acknowledge that there was
a surplus of 5 miffion unused people in the agricultural labor force.
We will gain a better understanding of this paradox if we approach it
as incidental to the industrial revolution that has taken place in Russia
since the end of the nineteenth century.
Russia's rapidly progressing industrialization was interrupted when
the Communists seized power. With the introduction of the Five-Year
Plans, industrialization was vigorously resumed in a new form—ruthless
state capitalism covered by Socialist verbiage about the interests of the
working class. With regard to employment, the industrial revolution
pursued two intrinsically connected goals: to provide manpower for
industrial development and to liquidate agrarian overpopulation—a
form of hidden unemployment. Hidden unemployment due to agrarian
overpopulation in Russia dates back to the time before the liberation
of the serfs. In 1923-1926, i.e. in a period when industrialization had
regressed compared with the World War I situation, estimates of excess
persons in agriculture (based mainly on a comprehensive inquiry of
the Research Institute for Colonization) went as high as 10 to 20 mil-
lion. In the early 1930's, hastened industrialization and compulsory
collectivization seemed to have put an end to agrarian overpopulation.
Soon it appeared, however, that the same processes of industrializa-
tion and collectivization that earlier had helped. to, absorb excess
persons in agriculture were now beginning to produce new rural labor
surpluses. For as mechanization of agriculture progressed (the only
positive aspect of collectivization), manpower requirements were re-
duced, and such reductions built up a group of superfluous kolkhozians.
In spite of millions absorbed by industry and additional millions who
had perished from famine, there was in the kolkhozes (according to
an official estimate of 1940) a surplus labor force ofmillion. Corn-
manist terror against well-to-do peasants and famine (resulting from
enforced collectivization), drove millions of peasants to urban centers,
where they found employment in. industries which developed rapidly
with the help of capital investment squeezed out of the rural economy.
I quote from an article of Sonin, a leading Soviet planner (Problemy
Economiki, 1940):
Editor's Note: Members of theConferencedeeply regret Mr. Kulischer's death
on April 2, 1956.
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"Owing to industrialization and socialist reconstruction of agri-
culture, unemployment and agrarian overpopulation were definitely
liquidated as early as in 1930. In consequence of a high degree of
mechanization and rapid increase of labor prductivity in socialist
agriculture, there is in the kolkhozes a surplus labor force (due to
its better utilization) that can shift to employment in industry and
construction or move from regions with not enough arable land to
those having much land. The number of such kolkhozians runs for
the whole Soviet Union to about 5 million."
The mass of rural people who streamed to the new industrial centers
in search of employment were unskilled workers, and they could be
utilized since there also was an influx of skilled workers from the old
Russian industrial areas. As a Frenchman would say, "Avec un cadre
de travailleurs qualifies on peut encadrer de nombres beaucoup plus
grands de la manoeuvre non-qualifiée." But when, in certain cases, the
flow of skilled workers ceased, there was no work for the rough rural
inmigrants, at least for a time. So, such activities as roadbuilding were
organized in the Urals to employ them during the very period of indus-
trialization boom. In other words, there was structural unemployment
which ultimately led to a sort of Works Progress Administration.
However, this was the industrial machine thrown temporarily out of
gear. The broad effort to industrialize was continued and intensified.
As an indication of the degree to which these efforts were pursued one
needs only to consider the frantic efforts of the Soviet government to
enlist a marginal group among the wage and salary earners—house-
wives, a part of whom formerly were semiemployed as helpers to their
husbands, small shopkeepers and artisans. There was indeed a sub-
stantial increase of female workers and employees, promoted both by
the necessity to contribute to the earnings of the husband, insufficient
for the family budget, and by the expansion of child care facilities. To
round out the perfect paradox, on the eve of the war, with 5 million
superfluous agricultural hands, the enlistment of women among wage
and salary earners had reached an all-time high and was still being
vigorously pushed.
At present there is no more superfluous labor force in the kolkhozes;
there is rather a deficiency of farm labor. How was the pre-Worid
War II hidden unemployment liquidated?
Huge military and civilian casualties in the war with Germany
reduced the manpower base mainly of the rural areas of the German-
occupied territory, for evacuation of personnel and equipment was
almost entirely from urban areas. In the'postwar years, after a relatively
short period of reconstruction, the cities picked up where they had leftSOVIET UNION LABOR FORCE MATERIALS
off. As before the war, the magnet of industrialization was strong
enough to attract a sum of migrants equivalent to the entire natural
increase of the rural population. In 1939 the adult agricultural labor
force numbered 39 million collective and independent farmers (ex-
cluding kolkhozians who worked only on their own plots) and 4 mil-
lion agricultural and related wage and salary earners; adding 7 million
in the subsequently annexed territories, we obtain 50 million who
before the war worked in agriculture on what was to be Soviet territory.
In 1950 the corresponding total was about 46 million, almost all of the
decrease having occurred in the male contingent.
The hidden unemployment in agriculture, formerly so large, has been
liquidated not by peculiar planning magic but by changes of the two
elements of the economico-demographical relation, both changes tend-
ing to the same result—an increase of available nonagricultural jobs
and a physical decimation of people looking for jobs. However, there
is hidden unemployment produced by another factor—not mechaniza-
tion, but ineffective planning. Unlike the former, the latter is essentially
a characteristic of urban economy.
Oxenfeldt and van den Haag have made a detailed study of various
other factors that obstruct a full utilization of the available labor force
in the Soviet Union, juxtaposing situations under planned and market
economies that tend to favor unemployment. The authors observe that
in Soviet economy nonutilization of resources appears mostly not as
unemployment, but as low productivity (in essence our old friend
hidden unemployment). Planned economy experiences a real depres-
sion if output goals are set so low as to leave available resources, goods,
or workers unutilized. On the other hand, managers are eager to reduce
the risk of underfulfilling their output goals; consequently, they tend
to hoard raw materials and workers. The result is again labor produc-
tiVityreducedthrough excess of workers (hidden unemployment).
Yet a convinced adherent of planned economy would not be silenced
by such shortcomings. He would say that in all these cases unemploy-
ment is due to defects in planning. If honest, he would add that these
defects show only that Russia is not ripe for planned economy. And I
must admit, I think too, if—Heaven forbid—we had here in the United
States a planned economy, several of the mistakes leading to hidden
unemployment would be avoided.
The Soviet Union—as well as the capitalist world—has been unable
to eliminate frictional unemployment originating from labor turnover.
Certainly the Soviet worker is by far not as free to leave his work as
the Western worker. Still, the stronger legal ties to the working place
are combined with chronic dissatisfactions over working conditions and
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the human urge to find something better. As a matter of fact, turnover
is probably even higher in the U.S.S.R. than in the free West.
There are many other such specific differences, but when it comes to
the question of unemployment in its broadest sense, we must not forget
the great similarity between the problems faced by the Soviet Union
and the Western World. And in this connection, I think we have lost
perspective. I do not believe that Adam Smith would have been as
concerned as we have become with the differing results of the planned
versus the monetary economy. We look condescendingly upon Adam
Smith and other founders of political economy when they introduce a
Robinson or a primitive fisherman in order to lay open the nucleus of
an economic process. We have lost interest for the economic Ding an
Sich. Since Keynes, monetary economy has become for us an organism
where everything is explained by the functioning of the system. It is
wholesome to be reminded from time to time that it is neither the
monetary system nor Socialist planning, but production, distribution,
and consumption that are by themselves as well as in their relation
to population the basic components of the economico-demographic
equation.
A. DAVID REDDINC, Council on Foreign Relations
Warren W. Eason's paper provided much new information, especially
on the labor force in Soviet agriculture. It is a careful, scholarly study
of high quality, rich in empirical research. However, because the Soviet
data were inaccurate and incomplete and were often withheld by
Soviet authorities, Eason found it necessary to lean heavily on assump-
tions in making some estimates. He was careful to point this out in
evaluating the difference between his estimates of the total and re-
ported labor force in 1939—largely because of interest in the "residual"
as a basis for estimating the extent of forced labor. I wondered, there-
fore, why he appeared to overlook the "explanation" of statistical
deficiencies in other parts of his paper and, consequently, to make in
one instance what seemed to me to be a less reasonable estimate than
could have been made on the basis of the evidence he cited.
For example, it does not seem unreasonable, a priori, to suggest that
Soviet statisticians may have overestimated the number of collective
farmers in 1936. This possibility deserves at least explicit rejection by
Eason, especially since other explanations were unsatisfactory to him.
More important, in rejecting a higher labor force—population ratio
for urban females in 1939 (than in 1926), Eason did not consider the
possibility of statistical deficiencies accounting for what he considered
would be an unreasonable phenomenon: namely, "a substantial num-
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ber of non-worker-and-employee females economically active in urban
areas, principally in the non co-op handicrafts sector. ..."° Heassumed,
in the absence of evidence, that the same percentage (72 per cent)
of female nonagricultural workers and employees lived in urban areas
in 1939 as in 1926. If, however, that percentage were raised to (say)
80 per cent, his estimate of 7.4 million female nonagricultural workers
and employees would be raised to 8.2 million; and these workers would
represent 92 (instead of 85) per cent of his estimate (itself subject to
sizable error) of the urban female labor force in 1939—leaving only a
small number to be accounted for as "female private artisans." A labor
force—population ratio for urban females greater in 1939 than in 1926
thus would not be inconsistent with the evidence on employment cited
by Eason; and, further, it seems indicated by other evidence cited
by him on the greater participation of urban females in economic
activities in the later year.
Use of a higher labor force—population ratio in computing the
number of females in the urban labor force in 1939 would, it should
be noted, result in a larger total labor force in that year and a larger
discrepancy between the total and reported labor force. The extent
of the increase in both magnitudes would depend, of course, on the
adjustments made to the ratio in question.
I am aware of the need for "numbers" in this field where data have
been notably inadequate. Eason's estimates are indeed a valuable
contribution to our knowledge; and, therefore, I should like to express
again my appreciation and admiration for the magnitude and high
quality of his work. However, I feel I should also stress the sharp
limitations to those estimates which are based (necessarily) on inade-
quate data. Awareness of the limitations is especially important to
readers who might otherwise use the estimates as a basis for still
further estimates or conclusions, which would in many instances be
unwarranted by the underlying statistics.
°Editor'sNote: The comment is as given originally; in hisrevisedpaper Eason
uses a higher labor force—population ratio.
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